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Abstract 
 
This paper builds on existing research on the merging of development and 
security following 9/11. Whilst much of the current literature focuses on the 
development policy of the US, this paper examines the UK. Investigating 
arguments that the UK's coordination of security and development policy is 
concerned with security at home rather than in the developing world, the 
policy discourse of the UK's Department for International Development 
(DfID), Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and Ministry of Defence 
(MoD) is examined through its major policy documents for the period from 
the late 1990s to 2011. Two levels of analysis are used; a content analysis and 
a discourse analysis. In addition, this research draws on interviews with key 
informants within DfID. This paper argues that since 9/11 and the War on 
Terror, the UK has increasingly coordinated its foreign policy, development 
and security actors. As a result, DfID has given progressively greater attention 
to issues of national security in its policy discourse. This action is justified 
through a series of claims of common interest between actors across 
government and between the interests of developing countries and the UK. 
This merging of interests opens up space for development to be focused on 
ensuring UK national security. Whilst drawing on a paradigm of broader 
security, this instead reverses the principal of human security where national 
security is now a development problem. 
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Introduction 
It has been argued that since 9/11 there has been a shift in development to meet 
security concerns. This is evident in attempts to coordinate development and security 
policies, leading to a closer relationship between development and military actors in 
the field. The concept of human security sought to merge security and development as 
a way of gaining greater attention for development issues. The principle aim of 
Human Security was to place the individual as the referent object of security and not 
the state (Henk, 2005; Newman, 2001: 239; UNDP, 1994). The concept is split 
between those who favour a narrow approach prioritising immediate threats to safety 
(Human Security Centre, 2005; Kaldor, 2007) and a broad approach that includes 
more systemic long term threats to security (UN, 2010; Institute for Democracy and 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2006). While the broad approach focuses more 
on development solutions, the narrow approach advocates military intervention on the 
basis of the R2P1 doctrine. The fear among commentators (Bachman and Hönke, 
2010; Ellis, 2004; Carmody, 2005; Ingram, 2007; Shannon, 2009) is that rather than 
security policy addressing development concerns, instead development concerns will 
be subverted by hard security considerations.  The UK is an interesting case in this 
regard in that its Department for International Development (DfID) operates 
independently of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. There is disagreement 
among commentators over whether DfID has maintained a poverty focus or whether it 
has shifted to addressing security concerns albeit in a more subtle way than USAID.  
Whilst some argue that DfID has maintained a firm stance on poverty alleviation over 
security concerns (Beall et al, 2006; Fitz-Gerald, 2006; Youngs, 2007; Wild and 
Elhawary, 2012), still others claim that UK development policy has become 
securitised and is geared towards protecting the West from the dangers caused by the 
underdevelopment of non-Western states (Abrahamsen, 2004, 2005; Duffield and 
Waddell, 2006; Carmody, 2011). Whilst some of the literature in this area addresses 
these issues in relation to isolated UK policy documents (Noxolo, 2012; Pugh et al., 
2013; Ritchie, 2011), none of these arguments draw from a systematic, empirical 
analysis of UK development and security policy documents over an extended period 
of time. 
                                                 
1 The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is a doctrine which advocates military intervention in 
humanitarian crises where states have failed in their responsibility to protect their own citizens. See 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty International (2001) The 
Responsibility to Protect. Development Research Centre: Ottawa. 
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This paper examines the evolution of DfID’s discursive engagement with security 
issues over the period 1997-2012 and, through content and discourse analyses of 
major policy documents from DfID and other UK government agencies involved in 
development, together with relevant interview data2, argues that DfID has brought UK 
national security into the core of its policy discourse through a gradual process over 
this period by linking poverty and instability in the developing world to threats to UK 
national security such as terrorism and religious extremism.  DfID has justified this 
shift through claims of common interest between development for people in the global 
South and security for the UK by drawing on the concept of human security wherein 
development is offered as a solution to national security problems. This is 
demonstrated through content and discourse analyses of major policy documents from 
DfID and other UK government agencies involved in development and an analysis of 
interviews with key officials within DfID. A content analysis3 is used to investigate 
the use of words associated with security over this extended period of time. This 
places the phenomenon within a broad time period and allows comparison with other 
development agendas over this time. However, there are limitations to word counting. 
A more nuanced understanding of how words are used and the meanings that are 
attached to them cannot be captured through a content analysis. In addition to this 
without a more detailed analysis of the text, there is a risk of over-interpreting high or 
low counts of words.  To address these limitations the discourse analysis examines the 
manner in which these words are used and permits a deeper understanding of 
arguments they are used to construct. In addition, the issues raised by the content and 
discourse analyses are investigated in greater depth through interviews. Interviews 
were conducted with two former Secretaries of State for International Development, 
three DfID officials operating out of London, two DfID officials working in Kenya, 
one DfID official working in Ethiopia and one retired Major General from the British 
Military. Whilst a greater volume of interviewees is desirable, the methodological 
issue of gaining access is always a problem when relying on interviews. In particular, 
                                                 
2 Interviews were conducted with nine respondents over the period of November 2012 to June 2013 
3 The content analysis was conducted using the word counting function on Adobe Reader XI. Headers, 
footers and bibliographies were excluded from the word count in order to avoid a possible skewing of 
the data. Variants of the words outlined in Table 2 were also included, for example for ‘failed state’ the 
terms ‘state failure’ and ‘failing state’  were also included in the count. 
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it proved quite difficult to gain access to any MoD or FCO officials or members of the 
military. However, this sample of interviewees does give a mix of perspectives across 
levels of seniority, government departments and levels of operation between the field 
and London. The interviews add a further depth of analysis to the issues raised by the 
content and discourse analyses.  
 
The first section of this paper is a discussion of the literature on the merging of 
security and development in UK policy. The second section gives an explanation of 
the documents chosen for this sample. The third section draws from a content analysis 
of these documents. The fourth section draws on both a discourse analysis of the 
sample documents and on interviews with key DfID officials.  
 
Security in DfID’s Development Policy 
 
There is disagreement in the literature around DfID’s engagement with security post-
9/11. On the one hand Fitz-Gerald (2006: 118), Waddell (2006: 543-546) and Youngs 
(2007: 11) argue that DfID has maintained a firm stance on poverty alleviation over 
security concerns. They point to  clashes between DfID and the Ministry of Defence 
(MoD) over projects that prioritised foreign policy over poverty alleviation as 
evidence of this. Furthermore, others claim that DfID’s leading principle is that the 
security of the world’s poorest and most vulnerable is of utmost importance and 
should be prioritised over the security of Western donor countries (Beall et al 2006: 
58). Still others claim that the closer relationship between security and development 
has led UK security policy to have a greater focus on development issues, stemming 
from a realisation of the limits of military power for ensuring global security (Pugh et 
al., 2013: 196; Ritchie, 2011: 370). However, as Howell and Lind (2009: 1288) point 
out, rather than a renewed poverty focus, a clear shift of development spending to 
meet WoT demands can be seen in the status of Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan as 
DfID’s top recipients, whereas prior to 2001 they were not in the top 20 recipients. 
Similarly, studies on DfID’s policy discourse argue that aid has become linked to UK 
national security (Noxolo (2012: 35) It is argued that developing countries are now 
seen as a source of insecurity to the West and that development aid is now used as a 
conflict resolution tool to shape the behaviour of African states so that they conform 
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to liberal values of the free market economy and democracy (Abrahamsen, 2004; 
Duffield, 2005, 2006, 2010; Duffield and Waddell, 2006; Stern and Öjendal, 2010).  
 
Of the existing studies on DfID, none analyses DfID’s own policy discourse in a 
comprehensive manner, although the contributions of Abrahamsen (2004, 2005) 
analysing the public speeches of key state officials, Duffield and Waddell (2006) who 
draw on interviews with DfID officials and Stern and Öjendal (2010), Beall et al 
(2006) who examine excerpts of DfID’s 2005 security document, Noxolo (2012) Pugh 
et al (2013) and Ritchie’s (2011) analyses of single documents released by the 
coalition government offer interesting insights into the subject. This paper 
complements this work through an analysis of key policy documents on development 
over the period 1997-2011, both from DfID and broader UK government, through 
content and discourse analyses and interviews with people working within DfID.  
 
UK Policy documents on security and development 
 
Table 1 Documents Sample in Chronological order 
 
Year Publication Title Government 
Department 
1997 Eliminating World Poverty: A Challenge for the 21st 
Century 
DfID White Paper 
1999 Poverty and the Security Sector DfID Security 
Policy Paper 
2000 Eliminating World Poverty: Making Globalisation Work 
for the Poor 
DfID White Paper 
2003 The Global Conflict Prevention Pool: A Joint UK 
Government Approach to Reducing Conflict 
DfID FCO and 
MoD 
2004 The Africa Conflict Prevention Pool: An Information 
Document 
DfID, MoD and 
FCO 
2005 Fighting Poverty to Build a Safer World: A Strategy for 
Security and Development 
DfID Strategy 
Paper 
2005 Failed States Strategy DfID Strategy 
Paper 
2006 Eliminating World Poverty: Making Governance Work 
for the Poor 
DfID White Paper 
2008 The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: 
Security in an Interdependent World 
UK Cabinet Office 
2009 Eliminating World Poverty: Building Our Common 
Future 
DfID White Paper 
2010 Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty  UK Government  
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2011 UK aid: Changing Lives, Delivering Results DfID Policy 
Statement 
2011 Building Stability Overseas Strategy DfID FCO and 
MoD 
2011  Multilateral Aid Review Ensuring maximum value for 
money for UK aid through multilateral organisations  
DfID Policy 
Statement 
  
Table 1, above, shows the sample of documents chosen for this analysis. Due to the 
coordination between DfID and other government departments outlined above this 
sample includes policy documents not just from DfID, but also collaborative 
documents with the FCO and the MOD and also broader UK Government documents 
dealing with national security. In this way both DfID’s policy and broader UK 
government policy on security and development are examined. This paper contains an 
analysis of all DfID’s White Papers from 1997 to present, (1997, 2000, 2006, 2009), 
key DfID strategy papers on issues of conflict, its bilateral and multilateral aid 
reviews from 2011 and all its Security documents from 1999 and 2005. White papers 
are important documents for analysing a government’s policy at a particular time. 
They are used to highlight what the government sees as key challenges and their 
vision of how these challenges can be overcome. DfID is extremely prolific in 
communicating its policy through publications; White Papers are useful for analysis 
as they tend to include the key issues raised in these other documents. The four white 
papers straddle the 9/11 period and provide an indication of any change in policy 
approach that may have occurred during this time. The documents dealing specifically 
with the issue of security from 1999 and 2005 also provide insight into DfID’s stance 
towards security post 9/11. The paper on failed states from 2005 is important as it 
represents the UK’s growing concern with the security and development challenges 
posed by failed states. The 2011 DfID document is included because it is the first 
development policy statement of the coalition government elected in 2010. The 
collaborative documents from DfID, the FCO and the MoD from the years 2003 and 
2004, covering the establishment of Global Conflict Prevention Pools by the UK 
government, are also included in the sample. In addition to these two documents, the 
collaborative document from 2011, Building Stability Overseas, is also included. 
These three documents are important as they represent the articulation of the ‘whole 
of government’ approach and set out the UK’s vision for conflict prevention.  The UK 
government documents on national security from 2008 and 2010 are important for 
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providing a broader picture of UK security policy and how it incorporates 
development issues. Whilst review documents of DfID's policy by third parties are of 
interest and were consulted for background, the aim of these analyses is to examine 
how DfID communicates its policy to the public, its peers and other parts of UK 
government. As result only direct DfID discourse is used and review documents are 
not included in the analysis. Similarly for MoD documents and National Security 
Strategies only the documents themselves are included rather than third party reviews.  
Below are the findings of a content analysis of these documents 
 
Bringing security in: a content analysis of UK security and development policy 
 
Table 2 Words for Content Analysis 
 
Washington 
Consensus Terms 
Post-Washington 
Consensus Terms 
Security-
Development 
Nexus Terms 
Liberalisation 
Deregulation 
Privatisation  
Global market 
Private Sector 
Basic needs 
Poverty 
Institutions 
Governance 
Inequality 
Human rights 
Civil Society 
Security 
Human 
Security 
Conflict 
Terrorism 
Failed States 
Stability 
Radicalism 
 
This section presents a content analysis of UK development and security documents 
from the period of 1997 to present day. This content analysis applies a framework, 
which focuses on key words associated with three main trends in development policy 
over the past 30 years; the Washington Consensus, the Post-Washington Consensus 
and the Security-Development Nexus. The key words chosen for this framework are 
shown in Figure 1 above. The purpose of this is to examine the significance of the 
emergence of security in development policy in comparison with other major trends in 
development thinking over the past number of decades. This allows a comparison 
between the three trends at two levels: both within documents and across time.  In this 
way the content analysis investigates whether the UK’s development policy has 
shifted over time.  The findings of this content analysis reveal three key results: 1) 
consistently low engagement with the Washington Consensus; 2) an increase in the 
security frame within development policy; and 3) significantly, a low count of 
development terms, either Washington Consensus or post-Washington Consensus, in 
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collaborative documents between DfID and other government agencies. This may 
indicate that, in merging security and development policy, the UK has brought 
security issues into development policy to a far greater extent than it has brought 
development considerations into security policy. This is consistent with arguments in 
the literature about the securitisation of aid (Abrahamsen, 2004, 2005; Duffield, 2005, 
2006, 2010) and is counter to claims in the literature of a mutually reinforcing 
relationship between the two (Stewart, 2004; Picciotto, 2004). 
Figure 1 Bar Chart of Grouped % Values 
 
Strong engagement with the Post-Washington Consensus 
Table 3 shows the total word count for each document and Table 4 shows this value 
expressed as a percentage of words counted for each document in order to allow 
comparison across documents. Table 5 groups together these percentage values to 
give a total for each frame. As can be seen in Figure 2, the overall percentage of 
words associated with the Washington Consensus is consistently low over the chosen 
period, in particular post-9/11. In DfID’s White Papers the percentage is relatively 
high in 1997 at 18%, this increases to 25% in the 2000 White Paper, but declines 
thereafter to 14% in 2006, 18% in 2009 and 10% in the 2011 document.  The national 
security documents, the collaborative documents, and the security documents 
published by DfID do not contain a large percentage of Washington Consensus terms. 
From zero mentions in the 1999 DfID document on poverty and security to a high of 
4% in the 2011 paper on stability overseas, the use of these terms is consistently low 
outside of DfID’s White Papers. In addition to this the use of terms associated with 
the post-Washington Consensus remains consistently high in DfID’s White Papers, 
staying at around 60% for 1997, 2000 and 2006, dropping to 40% in 2009 and 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
1997 WP 2004
ACCP
2008 NSS 2011
Stability
Overseas
Document
Grouped percentage values
Security-Development Nexus Terms
Post-Washington Consensus Terms
Washington Consensus Terms
  10 
increasing again to 52% in 2011, as can be seen in Table 4. This indicates a strong 
commitment to the principles of the post-Washington Consensus by DfID and these 
types of words have the highest level of any of the 3 groups of words in DfID’s 
documents on broader development policy. In particular, the word poverty is used 
with consistently high frequency, as can be seen in Table 3. This demonstrates that, 
from the beginning of this sample in 1997, DfID had little engagement with the 
Washington Consensus approach in its policy and had strong engagement with the 
post-Washington Consensus perspective. This trend continued over the period, and is 
most pronounced post-9/11. Whilst the move away from the Washington Consensus 
holds across all the documents in this sample, the move towards the post-Washington 
Consensus does not, and the difference in patterns across these documents reflects the 
complexities of the UK’s development policy. 
 
Merging Security and Development 
A second pattern that emerges is the increase in the use of terms associated with the 
merging of security and development. As can be seen in Table 4, the pre-9/11 White 
Papers have 20% and 16% in 1997 and 2000 respectively, post-9/11 this rises to 29% 
in 2006, 40% in 2009 and 37% in 2011. As noted above, despite this increase, terms 
associated with merging security and development are still used in lower numbers 
than post-Washington Consensus terms in DfID’s documents on broader development 
policy.  However, as can be seen in Table 4, in the two documents on security that 
DfID published in 1999 and 2005, terms associated with merging security and 
development are used in far greater frequency than those associated with the post-
Washington Consensus. This is understandable for documents dealing specifically 
with the inclusion of security issues in development policy, with security being the 
main focus the counting of words is bound to be skewed towards terms associated 
with these issues. However, the pattern of words for the 2005 fragile states strategy 
paper is revealing. Again the count of 65% for security associated words is misleading 
as the term fragile states counts for 47% of words counted in that document as can be 
seen in Table 4. However, terms associated with security are still used in large 
frequency. This document, together with the 1999 and 2005 DfID security strategies 
is indicative of the wider pattern that also emerges in the collaborative documents 
where DfID does not show the same level of commitment to long-term development 
concerns when it engages with merging security and development. This can be seen in 
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broader UK development policy in the collaborative documents between DfID, FCO 
and MoD. 
 
Also of significance is the emergence of new terms following 9/11. As Table 3 shows, 
the words ‘failed state’ and ‘radicalisation’ do not appear before 9/11. Similarly, 
‘terrorism’ appears only once in the 2000 white paper and not at all in the 1997 white 
paper and the 1999 security document. These three terms are then used in increasing 
numbers after 9/11 across both DfID, collaborative and government documents, as 
can be seen in Table 3. The emergence of these three terms, even though they 
represent a small percentage, is significant in that they reflect security concerns of the 
WoT – Islamic extremism that emerges from failed states and leads to terrorist 
attacks. The use of these terms suggests a strong engagement with hard security 
concerns in the UK’s development policy. The manner in which these terms are used 
is examined in greater detail in the discourse analysis section. 
 
Marginalisation of Development in Collaborative Documents 
The three collaborative documents between DfID, FCO and MoD in this sample show 
a heavy focus on terms associated with security and a marginalisation of terms 
associated with development. As Table 4 shows, the 2003 document on the 
establishment of the Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP)4 uses post-Washington 
Consensus terms in 17% of cases and security terms in 82% of cases. Similarly, the 
2004 document on the establishment of the African Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP)5 
only uses post-Washington Consensus terms in 8% of cases and security terms in 92% 
of cases. This suggests that while DfID is involved in these collaborations, there is 
little room made for development policies that act as long-term solutions to conflict 
within these documents. For example, the 2004 ACPP document does not mention 
human rights or inequality, two issues that have been highlighted more broadly as key 
to resolving the underlying causes of conflict (see for example UN, 2005: 5; OECD, 
2007). Similarly the 2011 document on creating stability overseas, issued by the 
coalition government, gives far greater weight to security issues, as can be seen in 
                                                 
4 The Global Conflict Prevention Pool was a collaborative body set up to deal with conflict through 
close collaboration between DfID, the FCO and the MoD  
5 The Africa Conflict Prevention Pool was a collaborative body set up to deal specifically with conflict 
in Africa through close coordination between DfID, the FCO and the MoD. Both bodies have been 
consolidated into one institution called the Conflict Pool. 
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Table 4, with 9% for post-Washington Consensus terms and 88% for security terms. 
In addition, as Table 3 shows, the term ‘terrorism’ is mentioned on 5% of occasions 
which is in greater frequency than either ‘poverty’, ‘institutions’, ‘governance’, 
‘inequality’, ‘human rights’ or ‘civil society’.  
When examining how security has influenced development policy, it is also useful to 
examine the reverse – how development thinking has influenced security policy. 
Looking at the 2008 National Security Strategy (NSS) post-Washington Consensus 
terms are used 16% of the time compared to 80% of the time for security terms. In the 
2010 NSS this falls to 10% for post-Washington Consensus terms and increases to 
90% for security terms. This suggests that development policies espoused by DfID 
have not had a big impact on other government agencies. This point is important as it 
was assumed by commentators (Stewart, 2004; Picciotto, 2004) that the collaboration 
between DfID and other agencies and the broader ‘whole of government approach’ 
that has been a feature of UK foreign policy over the past decade would result in 
greater attention for development issues. Merging security and development in DfID 
policy discourse 
 
As demonstrated above, three key patterns that emerge are: the consistent use of terms 
associated with the post-Washington Consensus, the increase in the use of terms 
associated with the merging of security and development - including terms associated 
with hard security in the WoT; a marginalisation of the use of development terms in 
collaborative documents and no real impact of development terms in security 
documents. These findings are important because while DfID has given more space to 
security in its development policy there has not been the reverse increase in 
development concerns in security policy. In addition, collaborative documents 
involving DfID, FCO and MoD give less attention to long-term development policies 
and greater attention to security issues. These findings suggest that, in collaboration 
with other government agencies and in the broadening of development to other 
foreign policy areas, long-term development policies are not given the same attention 
as traditional security concerns. Contra to the claims of commentators that a 
broadening of development to include security issues would developmentalise 
security, instead development appears to have become securitised (Picciotto, 2004; 
Stewart, 2004).  How has this come about?  There are limitations to counting words as 
a means of analysis, as outlined above, and so it is necessary to take a more in depth 
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look at the way in which these words are used through a discourse analysis. In 
addition to this interview data is drawn on to examine the extent to which policy 
discourse is consistent with development policy. This is the focus of the next part of 
this paper which, through a discourse analysis of these same documents together with 
interview data, uncovers three distinct phases in DfID’s securitisation of its 
development policy.    
 
Merging Security and Development: Three phases of DfID engagement with 
security 
 
As demonstrated in the above section, the UK has engaged with the language of 
security increasingly over the period of 1997-2012. In addition, it has introduced 
words associated with the WoT such as ‘terrorism’, ‘fragile states’ and ‘extremism’ 
into its policy discourse. A closer analysis of this merging of security and 
development reveals three phases of engagement with security in DfID’s development 
policy documents. The first phase can be described as ‘security as an exception’ and 
covers the pre-9/11 documents where security is tentatively dealt with and a number 
of restrictions are placed on DfID’s involvement with it. The second phase can be 
called ‘security as a core development problem.’ This emerges post-9/11 and involves 
a heavy engagement with security putting it at the heart of DfID policy. The third 
phase can be called ‘national security as a development issue’ and emerges in the late 
2000s and involves the introduction of UK national security as a development 
problem. The three phases represent three crude time periods: pre-9/11, post-9/11 and 
The Conservative party assume responsibility for DfID.  Each successive phase 
contains elements of the previous one and while they are not discreet analytical 
categories, they are a way of tracing the evolution of security in DfID’s policy. These 
phases are also marked by changes in who is the referent object of security. Within 
these phases both the UK and ordinary citizens are framed as being the benificiaries 
of DfID's actions on security. Within this change, two different conceptions of 
security are drawn on: hard security concerns associated with the WoT and broader 
security concerns associated with human security. As mentioned above, the concept 
human security is contested in the academic literature. It is beyond the scope of this 
article to resolve this debate. It is argued that the focus on security for the individual 
rather than the state is the common factor in most understandings of human security 
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(Chandler, 2012: 214). Therefore, for the purposes of analysing UK policy discourse, 
when security is framed as focusing on the well-being of individuals in developing 
states it is argued that it is drawing on the discourse of human security rather than 
conventional state-centric definitions of security. David Chandler focuses on the idea 
of ‘resilience’ as key to human security which “enables an analysis of human security 
that does not rely on the ‘word search’ approach favoured by authors who point to the 
rise or decline of human security merely in terms of the use of the term in official 
documents and reports” (2012: 216). As noted above, the count for the use of the term 
‘human security’ is low across all documents and as such, the content analysis does 
not adequately capture DfID's engagement with the concept. Similar to the above 
quote, this article addresses this issue by taking the understanding of human security 
in terms of framing ordinary people as the referent object of security which allows a 
deeper analysis of the issue than the above content analysis. In bringing national 
security into development policy, DfID brings these two different conceptions of 
security together through a series of arguments around common interest between the 
global South and the Global North. This section will examine these three phases of 
engagement in detail. Following this is an examination of the arguments around 
common interests that are constructed to link development spending to UK national 
security.  
 
1) Security as an exception 
 
When security is introduced into DfID’s policy discourse in the late 1990s there are 
clear limitations placed on its involvement in this area. It is made clear that the focus 
of security is people in the developing world and development involvement in 
security is only to meet that end “The poor must benefit (from DfID's involvement in 
security) and DFID will assess this before any activity can proceed.” (DfID, 1999: 3). 
The limits for DfID’s involvement in security are set at the poorest being the focus of 
the policy and sufficient civilian oversight of the armed forces (DfID, 1999: 2) due to 
a recognition that security forces in developing countries are often a source insecurity 
for the poorest and most vulnerable “The poor worldwide also tend to be very 
distrustful of existing police and criminal justice systems. Far from protecting people 
from violence, too often elements within the police and justice systems are themselves 
sources of violence and abuse.” (DfID, 2000: 23). In addition to this, DfID distances 
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itself from getting involved in traditional hard security concerns for fear of 
development goals being subverted (DfID, 1999: 6). As highlighted previously in 
Table 3, there is only one reference to ‘terrorism’ prior to 9/11. It is identified as a 
problem for DfID because of how it affects people in the developing world (DfID, 
2000: 7). In this phase, even when terrorism is mentioned, it is only in reference to the 
wellbeing of developing states, and the security of the UK is not a consideration. In 
interview, Clare Short - DfID’s Secretary of State for International Development from 
1997-2003, revealed that DfID became involved in conflict situations in the Balkans 
and Sierra Leone before it had formulated a clear policy. This could be seen as the 
formative stage for merging security and development in UK policy. In 2000 the 
Africa Conflict Prevention Pool and the Global Conflict Prevention Pool were 
established as a means of coordinating funding between DfID, the MoD and the FCO 
in order to resolve conflict through combined efforts. Coordinating funding in this 
way allowed DfID to get involved in activities deemed to be outside of official ODA 
limits, such as military and police reform programmes (Independent Commission for 
Aid Impact, 2012: 2).  As a result, policy was formulated after these interactions and 
clear limits were placed upon it in order to maintain a clear focus on poverty 
reduction6.  In particular, the intervention in Sierra Leone was influential in shaping 
top level UK development policy through the influence of actors on the ground and 
trends first noted there  “such as the privatisation and militarisation of emergency 
assistance” were later seen in Iraq and Afghanistan.  (Schümer, 2008: 9). For 
example, the supply by DfID of equipment to Sierra Leonean police as part of the 
reform process came out of consultations in country (Horn et al., 2006: 115). From 
this perspective DfID’s engagement with security arose out of involvement in specific 
events rather than from an existing policy position. As a result clear limits are placed 
on DfID’s involvement in security to limit it to specific instances where poverty 
reduction is still prioritised. 
 
Within this frame, even a hard security concern such as terrorism is presented as a 
problem for DfID because of how it impacts on ordinary people in the developing 
world, not because of how it impacts on the security of states in the developed world 
“…terrorism and the illicit drugs trade; the spread of health pandemics like 
                                                 
6 Telephone interview Clare Short, 23/1/2013 
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HIV/AIDS; and environmental degradation – are caused or exacerbated by poverty 
and inequality” (DfID, 2000: 7). This understanding of security is consistent with the 
concept of human security where the focus is on the rights of individuals in 
developing countries, and where there is a recognition that the state can be a source of 
insecurity for its own citizens. In this phase security is at the periphery of 
development policy and is focused solely on people in the developing world. The 
developing world is not portrayed as a source of insecurity for or a threat to the 
developed world. Elements of this understanding persist within subsequent frames. 
 
2) Security as a core development problem 
 
While DfID makes continuous reference to the human security approach of the earlier 
phase and to the restrictions placed on DfID’s involvement in security, this second 
phase still sees security brought to the core of DfID policy discourse. There are 
repeated assertions that poverty reduction will not be subordinate to security concerns 
of counterterrorism (DfID, 2005: 5, 6, 13) and that the poorest people rather than 
states will remain the focus of DfID’s policy (DfID, 2005: 5; 2009: 75). In this second 
phase of merging security and development, security is brought from the periphery 
into the core of UK development policy. In addition to this the definition of security is 
widened out to include issues of terrorism and religious extremism. Moreover, the 
referent object of security is now global rather than just individuals in developing 
countries and the developing world is represented as a source of insecurity for the 
developed world. The issue of UK National security as a development concern is 
strongly suggested but not explicitly stated 
 
In the documents published after 9/11 security is brought into the core of DfID’s 
development policy discourse rather than something that is exceptional and 
contingent. This is most evident in the 2005 DfID security document: 
  
“Wars kill development as well as people. The poor therefore need security as much as they 
need clean water, schooling or affordable health. In recent years, DFID has begun to bring 
security into the heart of its thinking and practice.” (DfID, 2005: 3) 
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Here security is placed at the same level as health, education and access to clean 
water. This shows a dramatic change from the restrictions placed on DfID’s 
involvement in security prior to 9/11. In this same document the definition of security 
includes threats such as terrorism and extremism.   While the human security agenda 
sought to elevate development issues to the same level as security issues, instead 
DfID has adopted security, now defined as including hard security problems, as a 
development problem on the same level as education and healthcare. Whereas 
advocates of human security distinguished security problems facing states from those 
facing individuals in order to prioritise the latter, here DfID brings these interests 
together. This position is reaffirmed with the assertion that “security is a precondition 
for development” (DfID, 2006: 45).  
 
In addition to this adoption of security as a core development problem, the definition 
of security is expanded to include threats associated with the WoT such as terrorism 
and religious extremism (DfID, 2005: 12; 2006: 47; 2009: 5). For example “violent 
conflict and insecurity can spill over into neighbouring countries and provide cover 
for terrorists or organised criminal groups” (DfID, 2006: 45). In this way the 
argument is constructed that terrorism is caused by poverty, therefore fighting poverty 
will fight terrorism. In addition, the argument is made that terrorism impacts on 
developing countries directly, therefore fighting terrorism can help to fight poverty. 
At this stage, the issue of development as important for UK National Security is 
strongly suggested but not stated explicitly. This is evident in the way that fragile 
states are discussed. The argument is made that they are a development problem 
because they suffer from poverty, thereby providing the space for terrorism and 
extremism to develop and therefore they are a global security threat as well as a 
development problem (DfID, 2005: 5 2006: 7; 2009: 6). When fragile states are 
referred to the examples given are Afghanistan, Pakistan and Somalia and they are 
referenced in terms of the danger they pose due to attacks on London, Mumbai and 
New York (DfID, 2006: 7, 47; 2009: 6). This is most evident in the following quote: 
“State failure and radicalisation such as in Afghanistan and Pakistan has brought 
terror to New York and London as well as Mumbai and Islamabad” (DfID, 2009: 16-
17). Here fragile states in the developing world are represented as a threat to security 
in the West. This is revealing as fragile states that do not represent a terrorist threat, 
for example Haiti or Niger, are not given space in DfID’s policy documents. As Table 
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1 shows, coinciding with this shift in discourse, DfID’s spending in so-called fragile 
or failed states and strategic states in the war on terror has increased significantly over 
the period under investigation. The frontline WoT states of Iraq, Afghanistan and 
Pakistan are consistently among DfID’s top 10 recipients following 2001. In addition 
states identified as conflict affected and fragile such as the Democratic Republic of 
Congo and Sudan are also among DfID’s top 10 recipients over this time. 
 
  
 
3) National Security as a development issue 
 
In the third phase in the merging of security and development, UK National security 
is highlighted as a development concern for DfID. This issue is raised directly for the 
first time in the 2008 National Security Strategy “we are also looking at the ways in 
which our overseas aid policy contributes to the security of the citizens’ countries and 
regions concerned, and also to our own national security” (UK Cabinet Office, 2008: 
52). This is the first direct reference to UK national security in this sample of 
documents. This is not brought into development policy until after the election of the 
Coalition government in 2010: “their (fragile states) instability has the potential to 
affect our own security” (DfID, 2011b: 59); and again “Aid is vitally important to 
tackling the root causes of those global problems – disease, drugs, terrorism, climate 
change – that threaten our own future” (DfID, 2011a: 2). In the previous phase, when 
the issue of global security as a development problem was raised it was also balanced 
out by assertions that development aid would not be overtaken by these concerns. 
There was a recognition that there may be a conflict of interest between the two 
agendas of UK national security and overseas development. However, in this third 
phase the issue of UK national security is adopted unproblematically. It is still the 
case that contradictions may arise when coordinating development and security 
agendas7, so the absence of this in policy discourse is an omission, rather than an 
indication that the issue has been resolved and no longer worth discussing. It is 
asserted that the national security interests of the UK and the interests of people in 
developing countries are the same and are mutually reinforcing “Helping the world’s 
                                                 
7 Telephone interview with Anonymous DfID official 2, 7/11/2012; Personal interview with 
Anonymous DfID Kenya official 1, 17/6/2013 
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poorest people is not only the right thing to do, it also makes sense for us here in 
Britain. Development makes a real difference to problems which might otherwise 
arrive on our streets, such as drugs, extremism and disease.” (DfID, 2011a: 36). The 
centrality of National security in DfID policy is justified through a series of claims of 
common interest. 
 
The claim of common interest between development and security in the global South 
and UK national security is strongly adopted and everything within this is assumed to 
reinforce this common objective. As a result there is now no attempt to offer 
reassurances that development goals will not be sidelined. This is most evident in the 
consolidated focus on fragile states. A commitment has now been made to spend 30% 
of UK overseas aid on fragile states (DfID, FCO & MoD, 2011: 2). The logic 
presented is that a vast number of poor people live in these states, and so spending in 
these countries conforms to the poverty focus set out in the 2002 Development Act8 
“sustainable development includes any development that is…prudent having regard to 
the likelihood of its generating lasting benefits for the population of the country or 
countries in relation to which it is provided” (UK Government 2002: 2). In addition to 
this, these states are described as “ungoverned spaces” from which terrorism, 
religious extremism, migration and trade in illicit narcotics flow and so resolving 
these issues contributes to UK national security (DfID, FCO, MoD, 2011: 8; DfID, 
2011a: 36). Fragile states are the sites where development and national security 
interests of poverty, poor governance, terrorism, criminality and extremism all 
overlap.  
 
Chandler (2012: 220) has argued that during this period there has been a shift in 
security policy from imposing solutions from the outside to support for agency within 
recipient countries to overcome security problems. Pugh et al. (2013) take this further 
and argue, through research focused mostly on interventions rather than mainstream 
development policy,  that the coalition government has overseen a shift to the 
‘developmentalisation of security.’ The  assertion is that human security is now in the 
mainstream, and the evidence offered to support this is that NGOs have expressed 
approval for this rather than objecting to it as may be expected if it was subverting 
                                                 
8 The 2002 International Development Act reformed UK aid policy to make sustainable development 
the explicit goal of aid and to remove the practice of using aid to further UK commercial interests. 
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development (Pugh et al., 2013: 199). Whilst this argument may hold for the 
intervention in Libya, the above content and discourse analyses show at the level of 
policy discourse UK security documents have consistently low engagement with core 
development ideas such as poverty. This is consistent over this period of time and has 
not changed for the most recent security documents published under the Coalition 
government, as Table 5 shows. 
 
This merging interests approach is also clearly evident in interviews conducted with 
DfID officials. The clearest example is in an interview with Andrew Mitchell, 
Secretary of State for International Development from 2010-2012: 
 
Security is not only achieved by armies and navies.  It’s also achieved by training the police in 
Afghanistan and building up governance structures in the Arab Spring countries and getting 
girls to school in the Horn of Africa.  These are things which are paid for by development 
spending but they contribute very much to our security in the end.  If you follow that logic you 
can understand that development and defence and diplomacy all go together 9 
 
UK security is framed in terms of governance and education and the argument is 
made that development spending on these issues will benefit all sides, both within the 
UK Government and in the developing world. 
 
This claim to merging interests between development in the South and security in the 
North heavily draws on a language of human security.  Interviews with DfID officials 
make repeated references to education as a security agenda10. The implication is that 
the UK now sees security in terms of broader problems relating to the welfare of 
individuals in developing countries rather than in a zero sum way of conventional 
state-centric security. This is reinforced by repeated references to the individuals in 
developing countries as the referent objects of security by interviewees, for example:  
“security, health, food crises, you know water hygiene, nutrition the well-being of 
people, these are all part of our policy”11 This human security focus on the welfare of 
                                                 
9 Telephone interview Andrew Mitchell, 29/1/2013 
10 Telephone interview with Anonymous DfID official 1, 6/11/2012; Telephone interview with 
Anonymous DfID official 2, 7/11/2012 
11 Telephone interview with Anonymous DfID official 1, 6/11/2012 also Telephone interview with 
Anonymous DfID official 2, 7/11/2012; Telephone interview with Anonymous DfID official 3, 
23/4/2013. 
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the individual notwithstanding, the state remains a principle referent object of 
security. The focus on fragile states is with the intention of rebuilding the state. In 
addition to this, the aim is to ensure regional stability. For example, the importance of 
supporting Ethiopia and Kenya in order to contain the fallout from Somalia is 
emphasised by DfID officials12.  In this third phase of merging security and 
development, the connection between the development needs of poor countries and 
the security of the UK is treated as unproblematic and based on common sense. 
 
A key issue is whether security policy discourse has been influenced by development 
thinking. The content analysis, above, suggests that it has not. Similarly, interviewees 
assert that development policy has not had a significant impact of security policy at 
this time.13 Whilst the MoD manuals on counterinsurgency do refer to winning ‘hearts 
and minds’ it is in the context of facilitating more effective military operations (MoD, 
2009a: 115, CS5-1), or “populations’ perceptions of their government” (MoD, 2009b: 
27) rather than addressing long-term development. Whilst not as overtly military 
focused as the US approach: ““Hearts” means persuading people that their best 
interests are served by [counterinsurgency] success. “Minds” means convincing them 
that the force can protect them and that resisting is pointless” (US DoD, 2006: 15), it 
still does not represent a significant engagement with long-term development. 
 
Where policy has changed over this period is that more space has opened up for DfID 
to get involved in issues of conflict and security during this third phase. Interviewees 
have asserted that framing national security as a function of development aid has 
opened up more space for DfID to address security issues that affect ordinary citizens 
and has made a stronger case for development within UK government14. Examples of 
this can be seen in the five year funding commitment for programmes aimed at 
increasing access to safety and justice for women and girls in Ethiopia (DfID 2011c: 
14). One interviewee described it as opening up space for programmes that addressed 
issues of conflict and security and also allowing policy activity in parts of the country 
that DfID had previously not been willing or able to operate in such as the Somali 
                                                 
12 Telephone interview with Anonymous DfID official 1, 6/11/2012; Telephone interview with 
Anonymous DfID official 2, 7/11/2012; Telephone interview with Anonymous DfID official 3, 
23/4/2013. 
13 Telephone interview with anonymous DfID official 3, 23/4/2013 
14 Personal interview with Anonymous DfID Ethiopia official 1, 10/6/2013 ; Personal interview with 
Anonymous DfID Kenya official 1, 17/6/2013 
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region.15 Similarly, in Kenya DfID has initiated programmes aimed at conflict 
mediation in the North Eastern region which has experienced significant conflict.16  In 
both countries interviewees expressed the view that the discourse representing 
development as a national security issue has made it easier to make the case for 
getting involved in these programmes.17  
 
security and justice programming within development plays a bigger part in the bigger 
national security picture. Which actually makes it easier for us to get that message back up 
through government because of the higher priority than it was with the last government who 
didn’t have that kind of narrative going on.18 
 
Interestingly, as DfID has become more involved in security focused programmes, its 
contribution to the Conflict Pools has shrunk. For example, DfID went from funding 
35% of the Conflict Pool budget in 2009 to just 5% of the budget in 2011 
(Independent Commission for Aid Impact, 2012: 4). As the Conflict Pools were 
established to allow DfID to get involved in security issues, perhaps the need for this 
coordination has lessened as security has become prominent in DfID discourse, DfID 
spending has shifted to conflict affected states and DfID has initiated programmes 
aimed at preventing and mediating conflict. This suggests that perhaps the strong 
engagement with security goes further than DfID discourse to its policy practice too. 
The merging of security and development in UK policy has given DfID renewed 
purpose in contributing to national security. This has resulted in greater funding for 
DfID, during a time when other departments have endured successive budget cuts. In 
addition, it has allowed an extended mandate to get more deeply involved in areas 
related to conflict resolution that was previously not possible. As a result there is a 
clear interest for DfID to sustain this closer connection between security and 
development making its enthusiasm for this policy change understandable. 
 
 
                                                 
15 Personal interview with Anonymous DfID Ethiopia official 1, 10/6/2013 
16 Personal interview with Anonymous DfID Kenya official 1, 17/6/2013 
17 Personal interview with Anonymous DfID Kenya official 1, 17/6/2013 
18 Personal interview with Anonymous DfID Ethiopia official 1, 10/6/2013 
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Conclusion 
 
This paper argues that DfID has brought UK national security into the core of its 
policy discourse through a gradual process over this period by linking poverty and 
instability in the developing world to threats to UK national security such as terrorism 
and religious extremism.  DfID has justified this shift through claims of common 
interest between development for people in the global South and security for the UK 
by drawing on the concept of human security wherein development is offered as a 
solution to national security problems.  This is demonstrated in two ways: the 
increasingly high word count for terms associated with security in policy documents 
and the three different phases of engagement with security which are revealed by the 
discourse analysis and interviews. This involves a shift from an initially cautious and 
restricted approach to one which places UK national security as a development 
priority. This is done through a series of arguments claiming a common interest 
between development in the developing world and security in the developed world. 
These draw on the main principles of human security, particularly the focus on the 
individual as the referent object of security, in order to make these claims. Coinciding 
with this shift in discourse is a prioritisation of fragile states in aid flows and DfID 
involvement in specific programmes aimed at addressing security concerns. The 
connections made between poverty and insecurity of people in the developing world, 
state fragility and UK national security open up space for DfID within its policy 
discourse to argue for engagement in areas beyond its principle remit of poverty 
reduction. The benefits of this for DfID have been a bigger budget and an extended 
remit to engage with issues of conflict and security. As a result, it is perhaps 
understandable that DfID has bought in to the merging of security and development. 
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Institutions 9.73% 1.82% 14.26% 3.41% 2.83% 3.10% 9.09% 6.31% 6.00% 6.91% 2.03% 2.06% 0.77% 11.81% 
Governance 2.06% 1.82% 0.59% 2.56% 1.06% 3.36% 7.49% 17.12% 4.05% 6.12% 1.48% 1.03% 1.28% 7.01% 
Inequality 7.37% 0.00% 6.25% 0.28% 0.00% 3.10% 0.53% 2.88% 1.62% 3.14% 0.18% 0.00% 0.26% 17.53% 
Human rights 7.08% 5.45% 4.30% 7.10% 0.00% 1.55% 0.53% 3.78% 0.65% 2.35% 0.55% 0.00% 3.08% 1.29% 
Civil Society 1.77% 2.73% 4.10% 2.56% 2.12% 0.52% 2.67% 5.05% 0.81% 5.34% 0.18% 2.06% 2.56% 11.62% 
 60.47% 17.27% 58.20% 17.33% 7.77% 24.29% 32.62% 56.94% 16.21% 41.13% 5.17% 50.52% 8.46% 59.78% 
Security -
Development 
Nexus               
Security 4.42% 62.73% 3.71% 20.17% 19.79% 38.76% 2.14% 8.11% 38.74% 12.56% 60.15% 11.34% 16.92% 2.95% 
Conflict 9.73% 16.36% 9.77% 52.84% 69.26% 25.32% 2.67% 14.95% 12.64% 16.17% 9.23% 17.53% 40.51% 10.52% 
Terrorism 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.42% 0.35% 6.46% 2.14% 0.90% 16.69% 1.10% 14.58% 1.03% 2.82% 0.00% 
Failed States 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.28% 0.00% 1.03% 47.59% 3.24% 2.27% 7.22% 0.18% 2.06% 4.87% 15.13% 
Stability 6.19% 2.73% 2.93% 6.25% 2.47% 2.33% 11.23% 1.62% 7.13% 2.51% 6.09% 3.09% 21.03% 0.55% 
Radicalism 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.57% 0.00% 0.26% 0.00% 0.54% 2.92% 0.63% 0.74% 1.03% 0.51% 0.00% 
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 20.35% 81.82% 16.41% 81.53% 91.87% 74.16% 65.78% 29.37% 80.39% 40.19% 90.96% 36.08% 86.67% 29.15% 
 
 
Table 5: Word Count Percentage for each Policy Grouping 
 
1997 
WP 
1999 
Security 
Strategy 
2000 
WP 
2003 
GCPP 
2004 
ACCP 
2005 
Security 
Paper 
2005 
Fragile 
States  
2006 
WP 
2008 
NSS 
2009 
WP 
2010 
Security 
Strategy 
2011 
UK aid 
2011 
Stability 
Overseas 
2011 
Multilateral 
Aid 
Review 
Washington 
Consensus 
Terms 19.17% 0.00% 25.20% 0.85% 0.35% 0.78% 1.60% 13.69% 3.40% 18.68% 3.87% 13.40% 4.87% 10.89% 
Post-
Washington 
Consensus 
Terms 60.47% 17.27% 58.20% 17.33% 7.77% 24.29% 32.62% 56.94% 16.21% 41.13% 5.17% 50.52% 8.46% 59.78% 
Security-
Development 
Nexus 
Terms 20.35% 81.82% 16.41% 81.53% 91.87% 74.16% 65.78% 29.37% 80.39% 40.19% 90.96% 36.08% 86.67% 29.15% 
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Table 6: Top 10 Recipients of DfID ODA 1997-2011* 
*Source the Organisation for Economic Cooperation on Development-Development Assistance  
 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
1 India 
153.96 
India 
186.60 
India 
131.68 
Uganda 
216.57 
Tanzani
a 
285.39 
Serbia 
459.74 
India 
329.88 
India 
370.15 
Nigeria 
2200.8
9 
Nigeria 
3185.7
4 
India 
510.53 
Iraq 
639.04 
India 
630.34 
India 
650.34 
Ethiopia 
552.25 
2 Guyana 
150.53 
Tanzani
a 
158.63 
Bangla
desh 
114.90 
India 
204.16 
Mozam
bique 
185.15 
India 
343.72 
Tanzani
a 
285.47 
Congo, 
Dem. Rep. 
300.97 
Iraq 
1317.5
2 
India 
349.30 
Ethiopi
a 
291.07 
India 
613.12 
Ethiopia 
342.92 
Ethiopia 
406.95 
India 
453.85 
3 Zambia 
93.71 
Uganda 
105.56 
Uganda 
96.38 
Tanzania 
152.73 
India 
173.88 
Afghan
istan 
130.80 
Bangla
desh 
260.47 
Zambia 
282.55 
India 
579.24 
Afghan
istan 
246.49 
Nigeria 
285.95 
Afghanista
n 
322.31 
Afghanista
n 
324.39 
Pakistan 
298.51 
Afghanista
n 
423.42 
4 Uganda 
78.18 
Bangla
desh 
98.95 
Ghana 
91.78 
Zambia 
111.41 
Banglad
esh 
124.47 
Ghana 
122.49 
Iraq 
179.98 
Ghana 
280.03 
Tanzan
ia 
220.35 
Tanzan
ia 
218.86 
Afghan
istan 
268.71 
Pakistan 
260.32 
Sudan 
292.42 
Nigeria 
264.61 
Congo, 
Dem. Rep. 
383.05 
5 Mozambique 
72.48 
Montse
rrat 
65.10 
Tanzani
a 
88.63 
Bangladesh 
103.36 
Ghana 
97.84 
Tanzan
ia 
109.31 
Ghana 
123.90 
Iraq 
275.10 
Afghan
istan 
219.92 
Sudan 
215.55 
Bangla
desh 
245.57 
Tanzania 
254.22 
Bangladesh 
250.08 
Congo, 
Dem. Rep. 
250.78 
Bangladesh 
368.62 
6 Bangladesh 
70.29 
Ghana 
64.63 
Malawi 
77.27 
Malawi 
96.89 
Uganda 
82.22 
Bangla
desh 
101.82 
South 
Africa 
122.91 
Bangladesh 
252.72 
Bangla
desh 
203.27 
Uganda 
214.41 
Tanzan
ia 
230.69 
Ethiopia 
253.68 
Congo, 
Dem. Rep. 
225.46 
Tanzania 
240.94 
Pakistan 
331.59 
7 Tanzania 
67.63 
Malawi 
56.65 
Zambia 
63.58 
Sts Ex-Yugo. 
Unspec. 
95.22 
Malawi 
63.94 
Peru 
84.43 
Pakista
n 
112.12 
Afghanista
n 
224.01 
Sudan 
196.46 
Pakista
n 
203.17 
Sudan 
206.17 
Bangladesh 
252.53 
Pakistan 
217.51 
Afghanista
n 
234.83 
Nigeria 
298.86 
8 Indonesia 
57.22 
China 
55.43 
South 
Africa 
62.92 
China 
83.44 
Zambia 
55.76 
Uganda 
83.98 
Malawi 
106.35 
Tanzania 
215.63 
Zambia 
165.73 
Iraq 
203.00 
Pakista
n 
197.84 
Sudan 
199.16 
Tanzania 
216.65 
Bangladesh 
228.32 
Mozambiq
ue 
186.40 
9 Sts Ex-
Yugo. 
Unspec. 
50.34 
South 
Africa 
54.12 
China 
59.25 
Mozambique 
82.66 
Kenya 
55.12 
Pakista
n 
66.90 
Uganda 
104.65 
Ethiopia 
147.13 
Ghana 
119.74 
Serbia 
180.49 
Uganda 
166.13 
Mozambiq
ue 
197.88 
Nigeria 
188.89 
Uganda 
179.26 
Tanzania 
158.92 
10 Kenya 
46.6 
Kenya 
54.08 
Kenya 
55.02 
Ghana 
79.91 
Sierra 
Leone 
51.13 
Kenya 
54.39 
Afghani
stan 
98.61 
Nigeria 
126.09 
Malawi 
101.96 
Malawi 
170.94 
China 
162.43 
Congo, 
Dem. Rep. 
192.85 
Ghana 
153.93 
Ghana 
166.58 
Sudan 
157.34 
